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Abstract
We develop an agent-based model of disease transmission in remote
communities in Western Australia. Despite extreme isolation, we show
that the movement of people amongst a large number of small but iso-
lated communities has the effect of causing transmission to spread quickly.
Significant movement between remote communities, and regional and ur-
ban centres allows for infection to quickly spread to and then among these
remote communities. Our conclusions are based on two characteristic fea-
tures of remote communities in Western Australia: (1) high mobility of
people amongst these communities, and (2) relatively high proportion of
travellers from very small communities to major population centres. In
models of infection initiated in the state capital, Perth, these remote com-
munities are collectively and uniquely vulnerable. Our model and analysis
does not account for possibly heightened impact due to preexisting con-
ditions, such additional assumptions would only make the projections of
this model more dire. We advocate stringent monitoring and control of
movement to prevent significant impact on the indigenous population of
Western Australia.
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1 Remoteness
The state of Western Australia (WA) comprises the western third of the Aus-
tralian content. A landmass of over 2.5 × 106 km2, WA is not only bigger
than Texas, it is larger than Texas, California, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona,
Nevada and Colorado — combined. Despite this, the population of WA is cen-
tred in the state capital of Perth. Some 92% of the population of 2.6 million live
in the relatively temperate South-West regions. Nonetheless, geological evidence
suggests continuous habitation of WA dating back at least 120,000 years. These
first peoples continue to inhabit the remote and sparsely populated landscape
of much of the state.
The current coronavirus pandemic has affected the Australian continent
along with the rest of world [1, 2]. But, unlike much of the rest of the world,
the relative remoteness of Australia and an early and robust response from gov-
ernment has enabled Australia to (at the time of writing) be comparatively less
affected by the outbreak. Current efforts to estimate the relevant parameters for
the coronavirus pandemic are currently underway globally and efforts within the
Australian context are best summarised by the technical reports of Shearer[3],
Moss[4], Milne [5] and co-workers.
Modelling specific to Australia’s remote communities is somewhat less plenti-
ful. While chronic health problems in Australia’s indigenous population are well
documented and would possibly exacerbate COVID-19 related symptoms and
outcome, the very small size and remoteness of many indigenous communities
in Western Australia has been thought to be an asset.
The question we set out to explore is what effect will coronavirus transmis-
sion and have on the remote communities of WA? However, this is not the exact
focus of this manuscript. Here, we seek to model only spread of an hypoth-
esised infection between urban and remote communities. Our conclusions are
general and not specific only to COVID-19. To achieve this we build an agent
based model of propagation on a complex network topology modelling individ-
ual contacts. We employ expert elicitation to inform our model structure and
the interaction of communities. An agent based model is developed to run on
this structure with transmission parameters approximating those seen under the
uncontrolled spread of coronavirus. Ensemble model predictions for a distribu-
tion of these parameter values are then used to provide an ensemble forecast of
relative risk of community transmission within each community. The flexibil-
ity of the network contact model allows us to robustly test various state-level
intervention strategies.
Despite a land border between WA and the rest of Australia of 1862 km
there are only two sealed roads (and one intercontinental rail line) joining WA
to the rest of Australia. Connectivity between many of the regions within
WA are similarly limited. During the first half of 2020 this was exploited by
the state government to limit movement between the 11 administrative regions
internal to the state. At the time of writing access to many remote communities
within those regions (most notably, within the Kimberley) remains restricted.
Nonetheless, there remains significant movement of people between these regions
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and settlements for a variety of traditional reasons. We model WA as an isolated
entity, in reality the remote borders are somewhat porous and the conclusions
of this study could be generalised to the entire Australian continent.
The challenge of this report is how to build a useful and informative model of
movement of people when data is extremely limited. For obvious reasons, mobile
telephony data is limited, course-grained or unavailable, Similarly, widespread
electronic monitoring and contact management has not been deployed and
records of the movement of people is rather limited.
2 Modelling movement without movement data
In this section we will briefly describe the data that we do have to inform this
model and then describe how we use that to build an informative model. In
an ideal world (from the modellers perspective) we would have information on
location and movement of all 2.6 million inhabits of WA and inferring model
structure from more diverse data sources would be unnecessary.
2.1 Data
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples make up about 3.3% of the
Australian population. Collectively these people cover an incredible range of
culturally diverse groups. However, identification within a particular group is
often a fraught and complex process. Australian census data, collected every five
years, lack the necessary level of granularity. It is estimated that there is some
120− 145 distinct languages spoken across Australia’s indigenous communities.
All but thirteen are considered endangered.
For the purpose of this study we apply a grouping into 10 distinct language
clusters (of which the 10-th is “other”). This categorisation is based on the
2016 Census of Population and Housing and obtained from The Australia Bu-
reau of Statistics Website. Furthermore, for each of 369 communities ranging
in size from 1.8 × 106 (Perth) to 0 (many settlements are only occupied sea-
sonally) we record the number of speakers of each of these languages. Denote
by ri = (ri(1), . . . ri(10)), where ri(j) is the number of speakers in community
i of language group j, a vector characterising the “language profile” of a given
community i. Let p(i) denote the population of community i. We also encode
to which of 11 regions of the state and to which local government area (LGA)
each community belongs. These are absolute numbers which set the quantity of
inhabitants speaking a certain language group within a community.
In Australia the LGA are often the lowest available statistical descriptor of
a geographical region of statistical interest. In WA the largest LGA by area is
East Pilbara and covers an area of 372, 000 km2.
In the remainder of this report we consider only the 297 communities in
WA with a population p(i) > 0. Without loss of generality we will assume
that i indexes only over those permanently occupied communities (i.e. p =
(p(1) . . . p(i)) is a vector of length 297. Figure 1 indicates the location within
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Communities of WA. Panel (a) depicts the geographical location and
relative size (log population) of the 297 communities of Western Australia used
in this model. Colour coding is according to region. Panel (b) indicates the num-
ber of communities in each of those regions (same colouring) and log population.
the 11 districts of WA of these 297 communities, along with the total population
of those communities.
2.2 Model
The agent based model we describe in this paper is an extension of that which
we proposed in [6]. A brief review of the most salient contributions to infec-
tion propagation models on network contact graphs is included in [6], and it is
that approach which we follow here. Of specific note is the observation that on
heterogeneous, but statistically well described contact graphs epidemic trans-
mission may be uncontrollable [7]. There is less work on statistical properties
of transmission amongst distinct communities (in the network science sense of
the word) within a graph [8, 9]. In summary, the approach of [6] allows for a
network based connectivity pattern to be applied across a population. Vari-
ous different connection patterns are proposed in [6] to mimic distinct contact
patterns and control measures. In this report we apply the same structure at
the level of communities, and then build a separate web of connections between
individuals within communities.
To do this we first need to build a rule for affinity between communities
— between which communities will people travel and which communities share
most in common. We model transport between communities under two regimes.
First, we model the scenario (imposed by the WA government from March 31
to June 5) of no non-essential travel between regions. Subsequently, we extend
the model to allow for inter-regional travel.
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2.2.1 Regional travel ban
Travel between WA’s 11 regions is only permitted if essential. To model this
we assign a bonus B1 if both communities are within the same region, and a
second bonus B2 if two remote communities are within the same LGA (urban
and regional centres typically either define or span multiple LGAs and therefore
B2 is only used to weight connectivity between remote communities).
Let δ1(i, j) denote a Dirac delta-type function with value 1 if community i
and j are in the same region, similarly for δ2 with respect to LGAs.
δ1(i, j) =
{
1 i and j are in the same region
0 otherwise
(1)
δ2(i, j) =
{
1 i and j are in the same LGA
0 otherwise
. (2)
Next we define our proxy for cultural affinity based on the dot-product of the
number of speakers of each language rir˙j . Finally, we combine these three terms
to determine the connectedness between two communities
D(i, j) = B1δ1(i, j) +B2δ2(i, j) + rir˙j . (3)
2.2.2 Regional travel permitted
To model the scenario in which regional travel is permitted we replace the affinity
score (3) with
D(i, j) =
B3
d(i, j)
+ rir˙j . (4)
where d(i, j) is the ordinary straight line (great circle) distance between community-
i and community-j. The parameter B3 effectively weight between mass trans-
port between communities and transport based on cultural affinity as measured
through language similarity.
2.2.3 Community affinity
Figure 2 depicts the connectivity network which we obtain by applying this
measure across the 297 occupied communities of WA. We set B1 = 100 and
B2 = 10. An ad hoc exploration of the parameter sensitivity of these two pa-
rameters did not show any significant consequence to this choice. Consultation
with community members and Aboriginal Elders through a process of expert
elicitation confirmed that the structure which we inferred was consistent with
their expectations.
Note that the affinity metric D is not dependent on the population of either
community, but only determined by an arbitrary linear combination of two
proximity measures and a measure of similarity in language.
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Figure 2: Communities of WA are displayed here as a network with connec-
tivity indicted by links (a) stronger connection indicated as darker connection
and (b) the heatmap of the corresponding adjacency matrix. Communities are
very approximately ordered from largest to smallest. The largest 59 towns and
cities first and the large number of small remote communities subsequently. The
heatmap clearly shows strong interconnection among many of the remote com-
munities and variable connectivity strength amongst the towns and cities. The
interaction between remote and urban centres is not strong giving the heatmap
the block diagonal appearance.
2.2.4 Contact models
We now build the connectivity matrix for the state. To do this we first decide
on a connection rule from amongst those described in [6]. In [6] these rules were
used to model the effect of different city-level control measures. We will do the
same here, but the connectivity rule must be determined prior to generating
the state-level contact graph. Briefly the various rules for contact within a
community which were introduced in [6] are
• Scale-free network: full mixing and no limitation of contact between
individuals. Mass gatherings, crowds and movement are not restricted.
• Truncated scale-free network: as above, but node degree is bounded
above by N . Gatherings are therefore limited to no more than N partici-
pants.
• Random graph: random connection between nodes, but degree following
a binomial distribution. Movement is permitted, but contacts are limited
— no large gatherings of any size
• Small-world lattice: a small-world-like lattice structure. Movement is
discouraged, non-compliance is modelled as long range connections.
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• Lattice: connection on a 2-D lattice propagation is only via diffusion
to neighbours. Complete lock-down, nodes only contact their (literal)
neighbours.
• Edge thinning: Random deletion of some proportion of links in one
of the previously described network models. Models the effect of effi-
cient contact tracing and infection identification, through, for-example, a
smartphone based contact tracing application.
We choose a contact rule and apply that to each community independently
and therefore build a network of 297 disjoint components. Note that, for very
small communities, each of these models is will effectively yield almost all-to-all
connection. The topological structure is really only significant in large settle-
ments. At this point we introduce a parameter τ which we characterise as
the propensity to travel. In our simplest model, each community will have
some proportion of travellers τ moving from that community to others. That
is, τP (i) edges emanating from community i and destined to connect to other
communities.
It is likely, however, that smaller communities will be more mobile and mem-
bers of smaller communities are more likely to travel — often these very small
communities will not necessarily provide all essential services. Hence let T (i)
denote the number of links emanating from community i, in the unbiased model
Tu(i) = bτP (i)c. However, a biased model that allows more travel from small
communities is more reasonable and under the biased model we defined
Tb(i) = bτ
√
P (i)
∑
i P (i)∑
i
√
P (i)
c. (5)
The choice of
√· as the bias function is arbitrary, any contracting nonlinear
monotonic increasing function will do.
Note that Ti is the number of travellers from community i. Other commu-
nities may well have travellers connecting to community i as well. Hence the
total number of links between community i and other communities will almost
always be greater than Tb(i) (or Tu(i)). In what follows we will use T (i) to
denote either Tu(i) or Tb(i).
We need to add T (i) links between community i and other communities. For
each node we do the following. First, we choose a source node uniformly at ran-
dom from amongst the nodes of community i. Second, we choose a destination
community according to the affinity score encoded in the i-th row of D. That
is,
Prob(destination is community j) ∝ D(i, j).max
(
P (i)
P (j)
, 1
)
(6)
for all j 6= i. Having chosen the destination community, we need to now choose
a node from within that destination community to be the target. Third, we
choose that node in one of two ways: (i) uniformly at random, or (ii) with
probability proportional to the degree of the target node.
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τ 0.01
B1 100
B2 10
B3 1000 (km)
p 15
q 17
r 114
number of seeds 5
Table 1: Epidemic simulation parameters.
By enforcing node degree of the target node as a criteria for the destination
we are selecting targets by popularity — we are operationalising the often in-
voked maxim of preferential attachment in this social network. Note that we
could do the same for the source node, but, only for the sake of simplicity, we
choose to overlook that further complication at present.
3 Results
We now describe the results of the application of this model to the population
of WA. In what follows, for each chosen set of parameter values and contact rule
we perform 1000 simulations with each of the 6 distinct contact rules described
above, for 210 days each for the entire population of Western Australia. Model
parameters are stated in Table 1. Results reported here for the affinity rule
(4) (i.e. Sec. 2.2.2). Results for (3) naturally had significantly less transport
between regions however the impact of this effect is entirely determined by the
parameters B1, B2 and B3. When computations are described for the model of
Sec. 2.2.1 this will be stated explicitly.
The agent based model of disease propagation which we deploy here is the
standard SEIR model presented in [6]. That is, at each time step:
S → E a susceptible node i becomes exposed if there exists a node j that is
infectious (I) and aij = 1 with probability p;
E → I an exposed node becomes infectious with probability q; and,
I → R an infectious node becomes removed (R) with probability r.
where aij is the (i, j)-th element of the adjacency matrix A which determines
epidemic transmission contacts.
We quantify the vulnerability index v(i) of community i as follows. For each
simulation run and each community we compute the number of days until local
transmission is observed within that community. That gives as distribution of
times until local transmission from which we extract the median Mi. To provide
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Figure 3: Vulnerability of communities scaled from blue (low) to red (high).
Simulations commence with exposed individuals in Perth. Note that remote
communities across the Kimbereley and the outback are highly vulnerability —
more vulnerable than larger communities in the South West and closer to Perth
(the largest red dot in the lower left/south west). This is due to significant
interaction amongst these remote locations and also between remote and urban
locations.
a relative measure (different simulations are under different generic conditions
and need to be scaled) we compare this value to the value computed for the
community of Geraldton MGero. (a city of approximately 3.8 × 104 people
about 420 km from Perth - the nearest sizeable settlement to the north of
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Perth). Vulnerability is then defined to be
v(i) =
Mi
MGero
. (7)
Normalising against a fixed location and by computing median values we are
able to robustly compare across different parameter values and amalgamate our
results.
Figure 3 shows these results. The vulnerability shown here indicates very
significant risk for small and remote communities in the North of the state
and (relatively) low risk for larger urban areas in the South-West. Effectively,
there is a large amount of transport between the remote communities and they
effectively act as a single larger virtual centre. That virtual city is then strongly
coupled to major cities by virtue of the fact that there is some travel to each
of the remote communities. Risk across the remote communities is uniform and
quite high. This is because once a community experiences local transmission,
because that community is small the probability that the infected individuals
then travel to other areas is extremely high. That is, the remote communities
act as a strongly coupled virtual centre with the additional disadvantage that
small sample sizes make the risk of further transmission very high.
Figure 4 shows the comparative effect of models assumptions related to dis-
tribution of connections. Preferential attachment makes a slight difference —
increasing vulnerability. Unsurprisingly, the small bias term (5) preferencing
higher mobility in smaller communities also makes a difference — increasing
vulnerability of small communities and decreasing it for large (as we would ex-
pect). Overall though, the two effects cancel each other out (as indeed, the
overall connectivity is fixed). In Fig. 5 the representation of Fig. 3 is repeated,
but representing the four principle modelling assumptions separately. Surpris-
ingly, preferential attachment is again seen to not have a very significant effect.
We also see that bias of travel toward small communities (Fig. 5 panel (a)
and (b) somewhat decreased the relative risk to larger communities compared
to sampling travellers proportional to population (panels (c) and (d)). Fig.
6 repeats this computation for a simulations with internal travel restrictions
between the regions of WA.
Finally, we now briefly consider the original network structure 2 and whether
the vulnerability deduced here could be inferred directly from the connectivity
structure. Three different measures of centrality are computed and shown to
have a weak dependence on vulnerability (Fig. 7 (a)). The most predictive
measure of vulnerability is shortest path distance from Perth (Fig. 7 (b)).
Despite the fact that no microscopic connectivity information of population
distribution is used, shortest path predicts vulnerability very well. Exceptions
tend to be for smaller communities.
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Figure 4: Relative vulnerability for all communities with a bias of travel to-
ward small communities (left) and bias to preferential attachment (right). The
left violin plot shows a very slight increase in vulnerability for the majority of
communities (the small communities) and a much more substantial decrease in
vulnerability for the large communities when we assume more travel involves
small communities. The right plot shows a slight increase in vulnerability due
to preferential attachment.
4 Social context and Utility
This work was developed in the context of an ongoing COVID-19 epidemic
in Australia, where cases nationally are resurging particularly in Victoria. In
Western Australia a successful response included effective isolation, social dis-
tancing, hard closure of the State border, and isolation of hundreds of remote
Aboriginal communities. This was due to their heightened vulnerability from
both pre-existing health conditions, and remoteness from care. However this
isolation also comes at a significant social and economic cost.
This modelling enables the risks to remote communities to be identified,
quantified, and visualized, and also provides a mechanism for the potential
effectiveness of different measures to be individually assessed at a community
level. This creates a strong opportunity for communities to assess the alternative
measures available to them, and the reasons behind the health guidance which is
provided. More generally, where a similar underlying dataset can be generated,
this type of modelling can be extended to cases such as the potential spread of
a pandemic from a capital city to surrounding regions, or surrounding states,
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Figure 5: Comparative impact of spread under the four principle modelling
assumptions (a) and (b) are biased toward travel to/from small communities
via (5) and (a) and (c) are subject to preferential attachment of travellers to
higher degree nodes. Figure 3 is an average of these four plots.
elsewhere in Australia or the world.
5 Conclusions
These simulations show that remoteness and small size does not necessarily
insulate communities from heightened risk of infection. Effort has been made
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Figure 6: Comparative impact of spread under the four principle modelling
assumptions (a) and (b) are biased toward travel to/from small communities
via (5) and (a) and (c) are subject to preferential attachment of travellers to
higher degree nodes. This figure restricts movement according to the 11 regions
of WA, movement between regions is limited (but not eliminated — that would
be trivial). Scaling reflects relative risk — risk relative to the vulnerability of
Geraldton to an outbreak in Perth. Geraldton and Perth are in separate regions.
to calibrate the parameters of this model and communities interaction to the
current (2019-2020) coronavirus outbreak. Under these assumptions, and for a
very wide range of other model assumptions, we have computed vulnerability
13
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Vulnerability score compared with standard network measures (a)
three measures of centrality, and (b) Dijsktra’s shortest path. Perth has a large
vulnerability and is not shown. Node colours in (b) denote community size
(larger blue and smaller purple), with the largest communities fitting the trend
best.
of each of 297 inhabited settlements in Western Australia. The population of
these communities range over 6 orders of magnitude and yet we find that remote
14
communities remain extremely vulnerable.
This vulnerability is borne of two key assumptions in our modelling:
• A significant degree of movement between these communities, the struc-
ture of which is inferred from cultural affinity between communities. Our
proxy for cultural affinity is based on prevalence of spoken language among
10 traditional language groupings.
• Heightened movement of resident of remote communities in comparison
to urban centres. This is reasonable as services in remote communities
are more limited and a smaller proportion of urban dwellers do regularly
travel to remote areas.
The remote communities are strongly coupled and therefore act as a single
virtual city. Yet the distribution of contact among the population within any
of these remote settlements is relatively homogeneous, and any travellers are
likely to have had contact with a significant portion of other members of that
community. Combined, this creates a strongly mixed virtual city that is strongly
coupled to the main urban centres and the main sources of infection. Infection
travels rapidly to the remote regions and very rapidly amongst them. While,
in our model, it may take a significant time for community infection within a
large community to pass to another town, for smaller remote communities this
happens exceedingly rapidly.
Our technical assumptions of travel bias and preferential attachment had
some effect, but did not markedly change the main conclusions. Understanding
of these theoretical modelling constructs was largely consistent with observed
connectivity and betweenness within the similarity network. This suggest that
while this simulation may be only a cartoon of a real infection outbreak, it is
very robust and likely to represent true vulnerability in the communities of the
Australian Outback. Moreover, network methods are able to provide a rapid
assessment of expected vulnerability of communities, without the need to resort
to the full simulation. Of course, this assessment is only approximate as it does
not properly account for the unique structure of these small settlements.
Finally, we modelled the effect of internal border closure within the state. Of
course, impermeable borders between regions would prevent infection spread.
But this situation is somewhat unrealistic — and from a modelling perspective,
uninteresting. Instead, we model the situation that travel within a region is
fairly easy, travel between regions is somewhat more limited — but not elimi-
nated. For the sake of comparison we kept overall movement fixed (the conclu-
sion that less movement implies less transmission is hardly illuminating). Under
this structure out model exhibited a patchwork structure with uniform infection
across and within a particular region. Because regions of WA are hugely vari-
able in size, this meant limited transmission in the South-West (where there is
a large number of distinct regions) but rapid transmission across large areas of
the North of the state.
Our study is limited by lack of hard data of the precise internal movement
of people. Nonetheless, we have tested these model conclusions across a very
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large number of simulations and choices of parameters. Should better data
for movement become available the validity of these conclusion in a particular
setting would be very easy to test.
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